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RIDEOUT V RIENDEAU: GRANDPARENT VISITATION
IN MAINE AFTER TROXEL
I. INTRODUCTION
Rideout v. RiendeauI presented a case in which two grandparents, Rose and
Chesley Rideout, sought visitation of their three grandchildren. 2 Though the
Rideouts had served as the childrens' "primary caregivers and custodians ' 3 for
significant periods of time, 4 the childrens' parents, Heaven-Marie Riendeau, who
was the Rideouts' daughter, and Jeffrey Riendeau,5 ended all contact between the
children and the Rideouts due to a strained relationship between the Rideouts and
the Riendeaus. 6 The Rideouts filed a complaint7 pursuant to Maine's Grandpar-
ents Visitation Act (the Act), 8 which allows grandparents to bring a petition for
visitation when there is a "sufficient existing relationship between the grandparent
and the child" or when, in the absence of an existing relationship, a "sufficient
effort to establish one has been made."9 The Riendeaus filed a motion to dismiss,
1. 2000 ME 198,761 A.2d 291.
2. Id. 3,761 A.2d 291.
3. Id. 4,761 A.2d 291.
4. The Rideouts served as the "primary caregivers and custodians" for the first seven years of
the oldest child's life, the first four years of the second oldest child's life, and "several months"
of the youngest child's life. Id.
5. Heaven-Marie Riendeau was the biological mother of each child. Jeffrey Riendeau was
the biological father of the youngest child, the adopted father of the middle child, and stepfather
to the oldest child. Id. 3, 761 A.2d 291.
6. Id. 1 5, 761 A.2d 291. Though Heaven-Marie Riendeau actively sought the Rideouts'
involvement in raising her children in their early years, going so far at one point to sign power of
attorney for Rose Rideout to act as the legal guardian for the youngest child, Ms. Rideout's
involvement in raising the children apparently created tension between her and Heaven-Marie.
Id. 1 4, 761 A.2d 291. The Riendeaus also claimed that Rose Rideout's "interference in their
family unit" created tension leading to a temporary separation of the Riendeaus. Id. 1 5, 761
A.2d 291.
7. Id. 1 5,761 A.2d 291.
8. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §§ 1801-1805 (West 1964).
9. Id. § 1803(1) (A), (C). The statute provides in full:
1. Standing to petition for visitation rights. A grandparent of a minor child may
petition the court for reasonable rights of visitation or access if:
A. At least one of the child's parents or legal guardians has died;
B. There is a sufficient existing relationship between the grandparent
and the child; or
C. When a sufficient existing relationship between the grandparent
and the child does not exist, a sufficient effort to establish one has been
made.
2. Procedure. The following procedures apply to petitions for rights of visitation
or access under subsection 1, paragraph B or C.
A. The grandparent must file with the petition for rights of visitation
or access an affidavit alleging a sufficient existing relationship with the
child, or that sufficient efforts have been made to establish a relationship
with the child. When the petition and accompanying affidavit are filed with
the court, the grandparent shall serve a copy of both on at least one of the
parents or legal guardians of the child.
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claiming that the Act unconstitutionally infringed upon their parental rights. 10 The
District Court (West Bath, Field, J.) found that, if the Act were constitutional, un-
der the statute's criteria the Rideouts would be entitled to visitation; however, the
court determined that the Act violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.11 Accordingly, the District Court granted the Riendeau's motion to dis-
miss. 12
B. The parent or legal guardian of the child may file an affidavit in
response to the grandparent's petition and accompanying affidavit. When
the affidavit in response is filed with the court, the parent or legal guardian
shall deliver a copy to the grandparent.
C. The court shall determine on the basis of the petition and the affi-
davit whether it is more likely than not that there is a sufficient existing
relationship or, if a sufficient relationship does not exist, that a sufficient
effort to establish one has been made.
D. If the court's determination under paragraph C is in the affirma-
tive, the court shall hold a hearing on the grandparent's petition for reason-
able rights of visitation or access and shall consider any objections the par-
ents or legal guardians may have concerning the award of rights of visita-
tion or access to the grandparent. The standard for the award of reasonable
rights of visitation or access is provided in subsection 3.
3. Best interest of the child. The court may grant a grandparent reasonable rights
of visitation or access to a minor child upon finding that rights of visitation or access
are in the best interest of the child and would not significantly interfere with any
parent-child relationship or with the parent's rightful authority over the child. In
applying this standard, the court shall consider the following factors:
A. The age of the child;
B. The relationship of the child with the child's grandparents, includ-
ing the amount of previous contact;
C. The preference of the child, if old enough to express a meaningful
preference;
D. The duration and adequacy of the child's current living arrange-
ments and the desirability of maintaining continuity;
E. The stability of any proposed living arrangements for the child;
F. The motivation of the parties involved and their capacities to give
the child love, affection and guidance;
G. The child's adjustment to the child's present home, school and com-
munity;
H. The capacity of the parent and grandparent to cooperate or to learn
to cooperate in child care;
I. Methods of assisting cooperation and resolving disputes and each
person's willingness to use those methods; and
J. Any other factor having a reasonable bearing on the physical and
psychological well-being of the child.
4. Modification or termination. The court may modify or terminate any rights
granted under this section as circumstances require. Modification or termination of
rights must be consistent with this section.
5. Enforcement. The court may issue any orders necessary to enforce orders
issued under this section or to protect the rights of parties.
6. Costs and fees. The court may award costs, including reasonable attorney's
fees, for defending or prosecuting actions under this chapter.
Id. § 1803.
10. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, 5,761 A.2d 291. The Riendeau's motion was based
solely on alleged violations of the U.S. Constitution. Neither party raised any question regard-
ing the Maine Constitution. Id. at n.3.
I1. Id. 6, 761 A.2d 291. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
12. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, 6,761 A.2d 291.
MAINE LAW REVIEW
The Rideouts appealed to the Superior Court (Sagadahoc County, Humphrey,
J.), which affirmed the District Court. 13 A divided Maine Supreme Judicial Court,
sitting as the Law Court, reversed, holding the Act constitutional as applied, find-
ing the Act to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in preserv-
ing the children's relationship with the grandparents who had acted as their pri-
mary caregivers. 1 4 Two justices concurred, arguing that the court should find the
Act constitutional on its face, and refrain from placing any limits on the applica-
tion of the statute. 15 One justice dissented, arguing that the majority's finding of a
compelling state interest was not supported by the language of the statute, and that
the statute impermissibly allowed parents to be drawn into litigation before the
grandparents established standing. 16 As such, the dissent argued, the statute was
not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest. 17
This Note examines the Rideout decision in light of the United States Su-
preme Court's prior treatment of grandparent visitation in Troxel v. Granville,18
which held a Washington grandparent visitation statute broader than that addressed
in Rideout19 to be unconstitutional2 0 while leaving open the possibility that states
could provide a means for grandparents to seek visitation of grandchildren against
the wishes of the parents. 2 1 The note begins with an analysis of the various ap-
proaches taken by the states in adopting grandparent visitation statutes, comparing
Maine's approach with that taken in other states. The Rideout decision is then
analyzed within the framework established by Troxel and Supreme Court jurispru-
dence in general, with a focus on whether the Maine Act is sufficiently narrow in
its attempt to advance a compelling state interest. To this end, the note questions
whether the Act's "sufficient existing relationship" standard provides adequate
protection of parental rights or whether such a standard, absent more specific pa-
rameters, fails to prevent parents from being subjected to litigation more often
than may be constitutionally permissible by creating the possibility that parents
could become involved in litigation when the grandparents may ultimately lack
standing to seek visitation.
13. Id. 3,761 A.2d 291.
14. Id. 33-34, 761 A.2d 291.
15. Id. 35-46, 761 A.2d 291 (Wathen, C. J., and Rudman, J., concurring).
16. Id. 47-70, 761 A.2d 291 (Alexander, J. dissenting).
17. Id. 48, 761 A.2d 291.
18. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
19. For example, the Washington statute allowed any person to petition for visitation at any
time, and visitation was to be awarded anytime it was deemed to be in the best interest of the
child. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240 (West 1997). See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
at 67 (describing the Washington statute's provisions). By comparison, the Maine Act allows
only grandparents to seek visitation when they have a "sufficient existing relationship" with
their grandchildren, or when they have made "sufficient effort" to establish such a relationship.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1803 (1998). Furthermore, while the Maine Act bases visitation
in part on the best interests of the child, the Act requires that courts find that visitation would not
interfere with the parent-child relationship before visitation can be granted. Id. § 1803(3). Other
considerations weigh into the balance, including the relationship between the parents and grand-
parents. Id. § 1803 (H), (I). See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text (outlining the Maine
Act's provisions designed to protect parental rights). For the full text of the Maine Act, see
supra note 9.
20. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 73.
21. See id. at 70. See also text accompanying notes 103-04 (noting that the Troxel court
declined to hold any specific type of visitation statute as unconstitutional per se, and also sug-
gested that certain visitation statutes may adequately protect parental rights).
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II. GRANDPARENT VIsIrATION
A. Varying Approaches Among the States
Grandparents have no common law right to seek visitation of their grandchil-
dren in opposition to the wishes of the children's parents. 22 This would leave
grandparents without redress to seek court-ordered visitation in the absence of a
statute granting them a right to do so.2 3 Perhaps in response. to the growing role
grandparents may be called on to fulfill in today's society, all fifty states have
enacted some form of grandparent visitation statute. 24 With close to one-in-three
of all children under eighteen being raised in single-parent households, 2 5 "persons
outside the nuclear family are called upon with increasing frequency to assist"
parents in a child's upbringing. 26 That grandparents may be called on more often
to play a greater role in raising a child is witnessed by the fact that better than five
percent of all children under eighteen now live with their grandparents. 27
While all states have responded in some manner to the interests of grandpar-
ents in the face of changing familial structures, a uniform statutory model has not
emerged. Rather, the states have adopted a wide range of approaches for balanc-
ing the often competing interests of grandparents, parents, and children. Many
states provide for grandparent visitation only in cases where the parents have died,
separated or divorced, lost custody for some other reason,28 such as incarcera-
22. George L. Blum, Annotation, Grandparents' Visitation Rights Where Child's Parents are
Living, 71 A.L.R. 5th 99 (1999). See also Enos v. Correia, 647 N.E.2d 1215, 1218 n.ll (Mass.
App. Ct. 1995) (collecting cases): In re Marriage of Herreras, 768 P.2d 673 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1989); Kanvick v. Reilly, 760 P.2d 743 (Mont. 1988); Preston v. Mercieri, 573 A.2d 128 (N.H.
1990); In re Whitaker, 522 N.E.2d 563, 566 (Ohio 1988); Clark v. Evans, 778 S.W.2d 446, 448
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
23. Enos v. Correia, 647 N.E.2d at 1218, 1218 n.ll (noting that the power to grant visitation
rights must be found in the applicable statute; authority to grant such rights is not rooted in a
court's equitable powers); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 895 (Mass. 1999) (Fried, J., dis-
senting) (stating that a claim seeking visitation based on equitable principles "state[s] no theory
recognized under [the] law.").
24. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Troxel v. Granville suggests that passage of grand-
parent visitation statutes is due, in part, to the increased role grandparent's play in assisting
single-parent households in raising children. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 64, 73-74 n.1
(2000) (listing all 50 statutes).
25. The Census reports that 28% of all children under the age of eighteen live in single-parent
households. Id. at 64 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, 1997 POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES 27 (1998)).
26. Id.
27. Id. Four million, or 5.6 percent of all children under eighteen live with their grandparents
(citing U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, MARITAL
STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1998 (Update), p. i (1998)).
28. Eighteen states require either death of a parent, marital dissolution, or separation before
grandparents may be awarded visitation rights. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-409 (West 2000);
ARK. CODEANN. § 9-13-103 (Michie 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-117 (2000); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 752.01 (West Supp. 2001) (held unconstitutional in Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105 (Fl. Dist.
Ct. App., 2001)); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3(b), (c) (1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-5-1 (West
1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.344 (West 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, §§ 23, 26 (West
Supp. 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.27(b) (West Supp. 2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802
(1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-d (Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.2(bl), 50-
13.2A, 50-13.50) (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.05(B)(1) (West Supp. 2000); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (West Supp. 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-306 (Supp. 2000); VT. STAT.
tion,29 or in other limited circumstances such as when a parent has become "physi-
cally or mentally incapable of making a decision" regarding the child.30
Even among these states, which may be viewed as the most restrictive with
respect to the interests of grandparents, the stringency of the visitation statutes
vary considerably. For instance, while most of these states simply require that
visitation be in the best interest of the child, others add additional requirements.
For instance, both Virginia 3 ' and Tennessee 32 require that the grandparents have
had a relationship with the children pre-dating the visitation action. In Vermont3 3
a grandparent can only appear as a witness, not as a party in a visitation action.
Georgia 34 may be the most restrictive state, from the standpoint of grandparents
seeking visitation: In Georgia, grandparents are not only restricted to seeking
visitation when a parent dies or the parents cease to live together, but visitation is
also contingent on a showing of harm to the child should visitation be denied.35
Georgia is the only state to require such a showing of harm.36
The approach in most states, however, is to grant much broader rights to grand-
parents seeking visitation of their grandchildren, allowing visitation actions to be
brought even when both parents are alive and living together.37 All of these states
ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1011, 1012 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-204.1 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.09.240 (West 1997). For a brief discussion of each state's grandparent visitation
act as of 1999, see Stephen Elmo Averett, Grandparent Visitation Right Statutes, 13 BYU J. PUB.
L. 355 (1999).
29. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.344(c) (West 2000).
30. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1012 (1989).
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-204.1 (Michie 1995).
32. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-306 (Lexis Supp. 2000).
33. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1011, 1012 (1989).
34. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3(b), (c) (1999).
35. Id.
36. Tennessee also requires a showing of harm, but defines harm as a cessation of a pre-
existing relationship between the grandparent and child. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-306(b)(1)
(Lexis Supp. 2000). Georgia is, then, the only state to require a showing of general harm before
visitation may be granted.
37. Thirty-one states allow grandparents to seek visitation when the parents are alive and
living together. See 1999 Ala. Acts 436; ALASKA STAT. 25.20.065 (Lexis 2000); CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 3104 (West 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46B-59 (as amended by 1999 Conn. Legis. Serv.
137) (West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1031 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46.3 (Supp.
2000); IDAHO CODE § 32-719 (1996); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/607 (West 1999); IowA CODE
ANN. § 598.35 (West Supp. 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129 (2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
405.021 (Lexis 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1803 (West 1998); MD. CODEANN., FAM.
LAW § 9-102 (1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West 1998); Miss. CODEANN. § 93-16-3 (West
Supp. 2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.402 (West 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102; 1999 NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 125C.050 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West Supp. 2001); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-9-2 (Michie 2001); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (West 1999) (held unconstitutional in
Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497 (2000)); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (Michie Supp. 2001);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5 (1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.121 (1999); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5313
(West 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.3 (2000); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.433 (Vemon's
Supp. 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2 (Supp. 2001); W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-4 (Supp. 2000);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.245 (West 1993); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101 (Lexis 2001). Though
Illinois allows grandparents to seek visitation when both parents are alive and living together,
they may do so only if one parent joins the petition. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/607(b)(D)
(West 1992). Similarly, Delaware allows grandparents to seek visitation when both parents are
alive and living together, but visitation is not to be granted if, in such a situation, both parents
object to visitation. DEL. CODE ANN. 8 t. 10, § 1031(7) (1999).
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allow for grandparent visitation when it would be in the best interest of the child.
In some cases, this is the only requirement that must be met by the grandparents. 38
Additional requirements and safeguards of parental rights are imposed to vary-
ing degrees. Several states, including Alaska, 39 California, 40 Iowa, 4 1 Kansas,4 2
Oregon,43 Rhode Island, 44 Utah, 45 and Wisconsin, 46 require that grandparents must
have had, or attempted to have had a relationship with the children prior to peti-
tioning for visitation in order for visitation to be granted. 47 The preexisting rela-
tionship requirements are even more stringent in states such as Minnesota, 4 8 Mis-
sissippi,49 New Mexico, 50 Oklahoma, 5 1 Pennsylvania, 52 and Texas, 53 where a
visitation order is contingent on the children having lived with the grandparents
for periods ranging from a few months 54 to a minimum of a year,55 or the grand-
parents having established a "prior custodial relationship" with the children. 56
Measures to protect or safeguard parental rights also vary considerably among
states that provide for visitation when both parents live together. Some states'
visitation acts have no provisions that specifically protect parental rights. 57 In
38. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Lexis 1999); MD. CODEANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102
(1999), MONT. CODEANN. § 40-9-102 (1999), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West Supp. 2001), N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (Michie Supp. 2001).
39. ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.065 (Lexis 2000).
40. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3104 (West 1994).
41. IowA CODE ANN. § 598.35 (West Supp. 2001).
42. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129 (2000).
43. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.121 (1999).
44. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.3 (2000).
45. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2 (1998 & Supp. 2001).
46. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.245 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).
47. Tennessee, which allows grandparents to seek visitation only upon the death of a parent,
or when the parents are not living together, also requires a preexisting relationship between the
grandparents and the children. The Tennessee statute requires a finding of harm before visita-
tion may be granted, and defines harm as the cessation of a significant preexisting relationship
between the children and the grandparents. TENN. CODEANN. § 36-6-306(b)(1)(C) (Supp. 2000).
48. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West 1998 & Supp. 2001).
49. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-16-3 (West 1994).
50. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2 (Michie 1999).
51. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5 (West 1998).
52. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5313 (West Supp. 2001).
53. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.433 (Vernon & Supp. 2001).
54. For example, New Mexico allows grandparents to seek visitation when the grandchild
has lived with the grandparents for a period of at least three months if the child is under the age
of six, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2(C) (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2001), or when the child has lived
with the grandparents for at least six months and the child is more than six years old. Id. § 40-
9-2(D). In Texas, the requirement is that the child must have lived with the grandparents for at
least six months within the two years immediately preceding a petition for visitation. TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 153.433 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2001).
55. Pennsylvania and Minnesota both make a visitation petition contingent on the child hav-
ing lived with the grandparents for a minimum of a year. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5313 (West
Supp. 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West Supp. 2001). Mississippi allows grandparents
to seek visitation if they have supported the child for at least six months or the child has had
"frequent visits, including overnight stays" for a minimum of a year. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-16-
3 (Supp. 2001).
56. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5 (West Supp. 2001).
57. For example, Kentucky and Maryland require only that grandparent visitation be in the
best interests of the children. Whether, or to what extent the courts must consider the parents'
rights is not specifically addressed by statute. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Lexis 1999);
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (1999).
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several states, a court determining the best interest of the child must balance the
interests of the children or grandparents against the interest of protecting parental
rights,58 or at least consider the impact visitation would have on the parent-child
relationship. 59 Other states specifically require that a court determine that visita-
tion would not interfere with the parent-child relationship or parental rights before
visitation may be granted. 60 In some instances protection of parental rights mani-
fests itself in a presumption in favor of the parents-this may take the form of a
rebuttable presumption that visitation is not in the children's best interests if the
parents object to visitation, as is the case in California,6 1 or rebuttable presump-
tions that the parents' refusal to allow visitation was reasonable, as is the case in
Rhode Island and Utah.6 2 Similarly, Iowa and Mississippi both require that a
parental denial of visitation be "unreasonable" before a court may grant a visita-
tion order contrary to the parents' wishes. 63 Perhaps the most stringent protec-
tions of parental rights are found in Delaware, where visitation may not be granted
by a court if both parents live together and both object to visitation,64 and in Illi-
nois, where, unless the parents are living together, one parent must join the grand-
parents' petition in order for visitation to be granted. 65
B. Maine's Visitation Statute
The rights of grandparents seeking visitation in Maine are outlined in Title 19-
A, section 1803 of the Maine Revised Statutes (The Act). 66 The Act gives grand-
parents standing to petition a court for visitation rights when a parent or legal
guardian has died,67 when there is a "sufficient existing relationship between the
grandparent and the child,"'6 8 or when "a sufficient effort to establish" such a rela-
tionship has been made by the grandparents. 69 The court is then required to make
a finding, based on the petition and affidavits filed by the grandparents and any
affidavits filed in response by the parents or legal guardians, of whether "it is more
likely than not that there is a sufficient existing relationship" between the grand-
parents and the child(ren), or that a "sufficient effort to establish" such a relation-
ship has been made. 70 Any parents wishing to contest a grandparent's petition,
then, will necessarily become embroiled in litigation before a court even estab-
lishes whether the grandparent(s) have standing under the Act. This, of course,
leaves open the possibility that parents will be drawn into litigation even in cases
in which grandparents are held to lack standing. The problem is exacerbated by
58. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3104 (West 1994).
59. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West Supp. 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2B-5 (Lexis 1999).
60. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1803(3) (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
257.022 (West Supp. 2001); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5313(a) (West Supp. 2001); Wvo. STAT.
ANN. § 20-7-101(a) (2001).
61. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3104(e) (West Supp. 2001).
62. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.3 (2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2 (Supp. 2001).
63. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.35 (West 1996); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-16-3 (West 1999).
64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1031 (1999).
65. 750 ILL. CoMp. STAT. ANN. 5/607 (West 1999).
66. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1803 (West 1998). See supra, note 9 for the complete text
of Maine's visitation statute.
67. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1803(1)(A) (West 1998).
68. Id. § 1803(1)(B).
69. Id. § 1803(1)(C).
70. Id. § 1803(2)(A), (B), (C).
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the Act's lack of specific guidelines as to when grandparents will have standing-
courts are left to determine what, exactly, constitutes a "sufficient" relationship,
leaving no clear guideline for future courts or future litigants.
If the court finds that the grandparents do have standing, the court is to then
hold a hearing in which objections of the parents or legal guardians are to be heard.7 1
In assessing whether visitation should be granted, the court is to determine whether
visitation would be in the best interest of the child.72 Additionally, the court must
also find that visitation "would not significantly interfere with any parent-child
relationship or with the parent's rightful authority over the child" before visitation
may be awarded to the grandparents.7 3
In making such a determination the court is to weigh several factors. First, the
court is to consider the child's age,7 4 the nature of the child's relationship with the
grandparents,7 5 and the preference of the child if the child is "old enough to ex-
press a meaningful preference."'76 The child's living arrangements are also to be
considered, including whether it would be desirable to maintain the child's current
living arrangements, 77 the nature of the living arrangements proposed by the grand-
parents,7 8 and how the child has adjusted to their "present home, school, and com-
munity."7 9
The court is also required at this stage to weigh the nature of the relationship
between the parents and grandparents. In making its visitation determination, the
court must consider "the motivation of the parties involved, '80 the ability of the
grandparents and parents to "cooperate in child care,"'8 1 and the means by which
the parties can settle disputes and facilitate cooperation as well as the willingness
of the parties to do so.82 Finally, the court is to consider any other factor that may
affect the "physical and psychological well-being of the child."'83
In sum, the Act requires a three-step process: first, the grandparents are to file
a petition and any supporting affidavits alleging a sufficient existing relationship.
The parents or guardians may respond with affidavits of their own, meaning they
may become involved in litigation before a court has determined that the grandpar-
ents have standing to seek visitation. Next, the court must determine whether it is
more likely than not that a sufficient existing relationship exists between the child
and the grandparents, or that sufficient efforts have been made to establish such a
relationship. Finally, if such a finding is made, the court is to hold a hearing to
determine whether visitation would be in the best interests of the child, weighing
all the factors outlined above.
The extent to which the District Court formally followed this procedure in
Rideout is not entirely clear: the court simultaneously entertained a motion to
71. Id. § 1803(2)(D).
72. Id. § 1803(3).
73. Id.
74. Id. § 1803(3)(A).
75. Id. § 1803(3)(B).
76. Id. § 1803(3)(C).
77. Id. § 1803(3)(D).
78. Id. § 1803(3)(E).
79. Id. § 1803(3)(G).
80. Id. § 1803(3)(F).
81. Id. § 1803(3)(H).
82. Id. § 1803(3(l).
83. Id. § 1803(3(J).
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dismiss filed by the Riendeaus while also holding a hearing to consider the merits
of the Rideouts' petition. 84 It was at this hearing that the court found the Act to be
unconstitutional, while also finding that, if the Act were constitutional, the Rideouts
would otherwise be entitled to visitation. 85
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Troxel v. Granville
The Rideout decision came in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Troxel v. Granville.86 In Troxel, the Supreme Court held that a Washington
State visitation statute, as applied, unconstitutionally infringed on the parental in-
terest in the "care, custody, and control" of children, an interest the Court referred
to as "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the]
Court."'87 The Court found the Washington statute to be "breathtakingly broad"
because it allowed any person to petition for visitation at any time, and because it
allowed the court to grant visitation whenever it would serve a child's best inter-
ests as determined by the court. 88 The statute's best interest standard, at least as
applied, afforded no deference to a parent's decision that visitation would not be in
the child's interest, thereby placing the best-interest determination "solely in the
hands of the judge."' 89 The net result, according to the Court, was to "effectively
[permit] any third party... to subject any decision by a parent concerning visita-
tion of the parent's children to state court review" that could be overturned by a
judge's unfettered "determination of the child's best interests." 90
In finding the statute unconstitutional as applied, the Court declined to follow
the Washington Supreme Court's decision, which held the statute to be unconstitu-
tional on its face.9 1 The Washington court based its decision on not just the breadth
of the statute-the fact that anyone could petition for visitation-but also on its
reading of the U.S. Constitution as permitting infringement of parental rights only
in cases of harm, or potential harm to the child.92 This reading of the Constitution
served as an additional ground upon which the state court found the Washington
84. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, T 6, 761 A.2d at 295.
85. Id.
86. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
87. Id. at 65. The fundamental right of parents to control the upbringing of their children is
rooted in cases establishing parental rights to "establish a home and bring up children," Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923), and to "direct the upbringing and education of chil-
dren under their control," Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). These rights
have been consistently upheld by the Court over the course of the past 75 years. Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. at 65-66.
88. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 67. The Washington statute provided that "[a]ny person
may petition the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody
proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the
best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances." WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994).
89. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 67.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 63.
92. Id. The Washington Supreme Court stated that the best interest standard employed by the
Washington statute did not, "[s]hort of preventing harm to the child," provide a compelling state
interest to intrude upon parental rights. In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 30 (Wash. 1998).
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statute to be in violation of the Due Process Clause: because the statute failed to
require a showing of harm, it was held to violate parental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. 9 3
Having based its decision on other grounds, the U.S. Supreme Court declined
to address the question of whether a showing of harm is required before a third
party may be permitted to petition for visitation. 94 The Supreme Court plurality
opinion saw the problem with the Washington statute not as one involving the
question of whether the state could "inject itself into the private realm of the fam-
ily" but rather the manner by which the state had intervened in the Troxel case.95
In particular, as discussed above, the application of the Washington statute af-
forded no weight nor any deference to a parent's decision regarding a child's best
interests.9 6 More importantly, the Court noted, the trial judge had apparently started
from a presumption that visitation by a third party9 7 would be in the best interests
of the child, putting the burden on the parents to prove that visitation would not be
in the child's best interests.98
This approach ran contrary to the "presumption that fit parents act in the best
interests of their children." 99 This presumption serves to ensure protection of a
parent's fundamental right to control the upbringing of their children, while devia-
tion from the presumption impermissibly undermines a parent's constitutional
rights. 100 Because neither the language of the Washington statute, nor the manner
in which it was applied provided any protection of parental rights, 10 1 the statute
was held unconstitutional as applied. 102 However, the Court refrained from defin-
93. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 63.
94. Id. at 73. The question of requiring a showing of harm was addressed most directly by
Justice Kennedy's dissent, in which he argued that the harm to the child standard is not necessar-
ily required, and that the "conclusion that the Constitution forbids the application of... best
interests of the child standard in any visitation proceeding ... appears to rest upon assumptions
the Constitution does not require." Id. at 98.
95. Id. at 68-69.
96. Id. at 69.
97. As in Rideout, the third parties were the grandparents of the child in question. Id. at 60.
98. Id. at 69. The Court's determination that the trial court shifted the burden to the parents
is somewhat questionable, having been based on the following statement made by the trial court:
The burden is to show that it is in the best interest of the children to have some visita-
tion and some quality time with their grandparents. I think in most situations a
commonsensical approach [is that] it is normally in the best interest of the children to
spend quality time with the grandparent, unless the granparent [sic], there are some
issues or problems involved wherein the grandparents, their lifestyles are going to
impact adversely upon the children. That certainly isn't the case here from what I can
tell.
Id. (quoting Verbatim Report of Proceedings in In re Troxel, No. 93-3-00650-7 (Wash. Super.
Ct., Dec. 14, 19, 1994), p. 213). In his dissent, Justice Stevens characterized this language, and
other similar language used by the trial judge, as merely representing a conclusion that visitation
was in the children's best interests. Id. at 82 n.3. (Stevens, J. dissenting). Referring to the
plurality opinion's reliance on such language, Stevens stated the following:
I find no suggestion in the trial court's decision in this case that the court was apply-
ing any presumptions at all in its analysis, much less one in favor of the grandparents
... [tihere is ... only a "'commonsensical"' estimation that, usually but not always,
visiting with grandparents can be good for children.
Id.
99. Id. at 68 (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)).
100. See id. at 68-69.
101. Id. at 73.
102. Id.
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ing the full scope of parental rights or the potentially permissible scope of visita-
tion statutes, noting that "awarding visitation turns on the specific manner" in which
the standard for awarding visitation is applied. 103
In declining to declare specific visitation statutes as per se violations of the
Due Process Clause, 104 the Court did suggest that certain types of statutes may
adequately protect parental rights while allowing third parties to seek visitation. 10 5
Without addressing the constitutionality of any specific visitation act (other than
Washington's), the Court noted that some statutes create rebuttable presumptions
that visitation is not in the best interest of the child if parents oppose visitation
rights, 106 while other states, such as Maine, allow court-ordered visitation only in
cases where visitation would not impermissibly interfere with parents' relation-
ships with their children. 107 However, the Court also indicated that the protection
of a parent's rights must be substantial by suggesting that the mere act of engaging
in a visitation proceeding could be "'so disruptive of the parent-child relation-
ship"' as to infringe upon the parent's constitutional rights. 108 In this sense, the
Court warned that any attempt to involve parents in litigation over visitation could
infringe upon the parents' fundamental rights, unless the statute authorizing such a
proceeding were very carefully drawn. Still, the Court left the door open to the
possibility that visitation statutes could survive a constitutional challenge. 109
The Troxel decision created a legal framework that would serve to define the
parameters of the Rideout decision. Though Troxel did not enunciate specific cri-
teria for a statute to meet to stay within the bounds of the Due Process Clause, the
Court's holding did direct that a statute (1) allowing any person to seek visitation
without (2) giving any deference to a parent's decision, thereby allowing a court to
substitute its own judgment for that of the parent in determining a child's best
interests, would not meet the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 10
B. Standard of Review
The Troxel decision was void of any reference to the appropriate standard of
review.111 Nevertheless, this was precisely where the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court began its analysis in Rideout v. Riendeau. 112 The standard of review was
essential to the disposition of the case-the court held that strict scrutiny was the
appropriate standard of review. 13 The court could only find the Act to be consti-
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 70.
106. Id. (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 3104(e) (West 1994); R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-24.3(a)(2)(v)
(Supp. 1999).
107. Id. (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1803(3) (West 1998); MINN. STAT. §
257.022(2)(a)(2) (1998); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802(2) (1998)).
108. Id. at 75 (quoting Justice Kennedy's dissent, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 101).
109. Id. at 70.
110. See generally id.
111. Justice Thomas made this very point in his concurring opinion, noting that the plurality,
along with a concurring Justice (Souter) and a dissenting Justice (Kennedy) recognized the fun-
damental right of parents to control their children's upbringing without stating what the proper
standard of review should be: "[c]uriously none of them articulates the appropriate standard of
review. I would apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights." Id. at 80 (Tho-
mas, J., concurring).
112. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, 18-20, 761 A.2d 291.
113. Id. 20,761 A.2d 291.
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tutional if it found that the Act was narrowly tailored to further a compelling state
interest. 114 Understanding the standard of review required in cases involving visi-
tation statutes, then, is important in evaluating the outcome in Rideout. Determin-
ing what standard of review is to be applied begins with an analysis of the rights to
be protected, and the level of protection required by the Constitution. 115
1. The Fundamental Rights of Parents
As noted above, the rights of parents to control the upbringing of their chil-
dren was recognized in the Troxel decision as one of the oldest fundamental rights
acknowledged by the Supreme Court. 116 This fundamental right has been found
to be a core component of the Western concept of the family. 11 7 Given the impor-
tant role the legal system assigns parental rights in the development of the family,
the Due Process Clause is to provide "heightened protection against state interven-
tion" in parents' right to control the upbringing of their children. 118 In order to
ensure that parents' rights are afforded this heightened level of protection, strict
scrutiny must be applied in reviewing any statutes that intrude upon those rights. 119
However, while parental rights are afforded heightened protection, parental rights
are not absolute-under certain circumstances, they may be subject to legislative
restrictions. 120 Such restrictions may survive the Due Process Clause if the statute
in question is found to be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. 12 1
Narrow tailoring is particularly important given the Troxel Court's warning that
the mere act of involving parents in litigation over visitation may constitute an
infringement of parental rights. 122
114. Id.
115. See id. at 1 19 (stating that "heightened protection" of fundamental rights "mandates
strict scrutiny of the statute at issue") (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21
(1997)).
116. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 65 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401
(1923)) (recognizing the fundamental right of parents to "establish a home and bring up chil-
dren"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing the right of par-
ents to "direct the upbringing and education of children under their control").
117. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 66 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972)
("The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern
for the nurture and upbringing of their children.")); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)
("Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a
unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently followed
that course.").
118. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198,$ 19,761 A.2d 291 (citing Parham v. JR., 442 U.S.
584, 603-05 (1979)).
119. Id. at 1 19, 761 A.2d 291 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21
(1997)); Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Comm'r, Dep't of Educ., 659 A.2d 854, 857 (Me. 1995)).
120. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972) (stating that even when parental actions
are taken pursuant to religious beliefs such actions are "not totally free from legislative restric-
tions") (internal citations omitted); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1943) (rights of
parenthood are not beyond limitation); see also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
75 (1975) (stating that the state's interest in preserving parental authority does not extend to
giving parents "absolute power to overrule" a minor's decision to terminate pregnancy).
121. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (The Constitution's "guarantee of 'due
process of law' [includes] a substantive component, which forbids the government to infringe
certain 'fundamental' [) interests ... unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.").
122. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 75 (quoting Justice Kennedy's dissent, Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. at 101).
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2. Compelling State Interests
What constitutes a sufficiently compelling state interest to permit a state's
intrusion into the parental sphere of rights is not clearly defined by Supreme Court
jurisprudence. 123 Harm, or potential harm to a child is considered a sufficiently
compelling ground upon which a state may seek to limit parental authority. 124
While harm to the child is viewed as a compelling state interest, there is no formal
rule, at least not from the U.S. Supreme Court's perspective, that the harm stan-
dard is the only one that may justify legislative restrictions of parental author-
ity. 12
5
Indeed, the Court has recognized state interests other than harm to the child as
giving rise to state intervention in the upbringing of children. Specifically, a state's
parens patriae, or "general interest in [a] youth's well being," 126 is sufficiently
compelling to allow the state to require a child's attendance in school, 127 or to
regulate child labor,128 spheres of regulation that almost inevitably intrude upon
some parental decisions. 129
123. See id. at 98-101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing the history of parental rights vis-
d-vis third parties seeking visitation and the vagueness of the parameters defining compelling
state interests).
124. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34 ("the power of the parent, even when linked to
a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation ... if it appears that parental decisions will
jeopardize the health or safety of the child."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 168-69. The
Prince court placed certain restraints on parental authority within the state's authority to provide
for a healthy citizenry:
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth
of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this
against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of selection. Among
evils most appropriate for such action are the crippling effects of child employment.
. and the possible harms arising from other activities subject to all the diverse influ-
ences of the street. It is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed
to reach such evils is within the state's police power, whether against the parent's
claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary action.
Id. (emphasis added).
125. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 97 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (while "[s]tates have the
authority to intervene to prevent harm from children ... [this] is not the same as saying that a
heightened harm to the child standard must be satisfied in every case in which a third party seeks
a visitation order").
126. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 166.
127. Id.; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 534. The Pierce court summarized a state's
authority to regulate parental decisions regarding education as follows:
No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all
schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require
that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral
character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citi-
zenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the
public welfare.
Id.
128. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 166, 168-69.
129. In Maine, the "State's authority over parental decisions is well established in certain
areas." Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, 23 n.14, 761 A.2d 291. The State's sphere of
authority includes immunization requirements, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 6354 (West
1964), education requirements, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5001-A (West 1964), and "safety
requirements, addressed in the Child and Family Services and Child Protection Act, ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 4001-4093 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999)." Id.
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While the state may intervene in a parent's decisions in some instances, the
general presumption remains in favor of a parent's decision: a fit parent is deemed
to act in the best interest of his or her children. 130 Typically, then, provided that a
parent provides adequate care for his or her children, the state will not be justified
in challenging a parent's ability to "make the best decisions concerning" a child's
upbringing. 13 1 This suggests that, in order to find that a statute constitutionally
limits parental rights, a court must find special circumstances to exist, removing
the statute from the protected field in which a parent's decisions are presumptively
in the best interest of the child, and giving rise to a compelling state interest. Of
course, the statute must then be narrowly tailored to meet that interest. Determin-
ing whether such circumstances existed was the challenge confronting the Law
Court as it considered Rideout v. Riendeau. 1 3 2
IV. THE RIDEOUT DECISION
In Rideout, two grandparents, Rose and Chesley Rideout sought visitation of
their three grandchildren pursuant to Title 19-A, section 1803 of the Maine Re-
vised Statutes,1 33 which gives grandparents standing to seek visitation when "[t]here
is a sufficient existing relationship between the grandparent and the child" or when
a "sufficient effort" to establish such a relationship has been made. 134 The Rideouts
claim of standing rested on the fact that they had for significant periods of time
served as "primary caregivers and custodians" to each of their three grandchil-
dren. 135 Their oldest grandchild, Keiko, had been in their care for the first seven
years of her life. 136 Another grandchild, Roman, had been in their care for the first
four years of his life, and the youngest, Mariah, had been in their care for several
months. 137 Though the relationship between the Rideouts and their daughter,
Heaven-Marie, was difficult at times, 138 the extent to which the Rideouts were
asked to care for their grandchildren was demonstrated by the fact that Heaven-
Marie often placed Keiko in Rose Rideout's sole custody and at one point granted
the grandmother power of attorney to serve as legal guardian for Keiko. 139
130. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 602. In Parham, the court stated that the presumption in
favor of the parent springs from the parent-child relationship:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a
child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making
life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.
Id. (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447; 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW * 190).
131. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 68-69.
132. 2000 ME 198, 11,761 A.2d 291.
133. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1803 (West 1998).
134. Id. § 1803(1)(B), (C).
135. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198,1 4,761 A.2d 291.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. At one point the Rideouts reported their daughter's husband, Jeffrey Riendeau, to the
police, which resulted in a search of the Riendeau's home. Rose Rideout also filed allegations
of abuse and neglect with the Department of Human Services, and a suit to adopt Keiko. Id. 64
(Alexander, J., dissenting).
139. Id. 4, 761 A. 2d 291.
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After completing job training, Heaven-Marie moved in with her first hus-
band. 140 At this point, both Keiko and Roman, who had only recently been born,
were living with their parents. 14 1 When the marriage turned abusive, Heaven-
Marie moved back in with her parents. 142 A couple of years later1 43 Heaven-
Marie married Jeffrey Riendeau, only to be separated about a year later, which was
also around the time that Mariah was born. 14 4 The couple blamed their separation
on what they called "tensions caused by Rose's interference in their family unit." 145
Once again, Heaven-Marie and her children returned to live with the Rideouts,
who eventually sought to adopt Keiko and filed complaints relating to the Riendeaus'
care of the children. 146
Shortly after these incidents, Heaven-Marie and her children returned to live
with Jeffrey Riendeau, 147 and the couple then broke off all contact between the
children and their grandparents. 148 The Rideouts then filed a complaint seeking
visitation of their grandchildren. 149
The District Court (West Bath, Field, J.), after making findings of fact, granted
the Riendeaus' motion to dismiss, holding the Act to be unconstitutional. 150 The
court based its holding on the fact that the Act did not require a showing of harm
before visitation could be granted to grandparents. 15 1 The Act did require a find-
ing that visitation would be in the child's best interest, 152 but the court held such a
standard to fall short of a compelling state interest. 153 The Superior Court
(Sagadahoc County, Humphrey, J.) affirmed. 154 The Rideouts then appealed to
the Law Court. 15 5
The Law Court agreed that the best interest standard, absent other consider-




143. It is not clear how many years Heaven-Marie and her first two children lived with the
Rideouts in this interim period. She initially moved in with her first husband in 1989, and




147. Though Jeffrey Riendeau was the biological father of only one of the children, he adopted
Roman, while Keiko's biological father "surrendered his parental rights" to Mr. Riendeau. Id.
3. So, while Mr. Riendeau was not the natural father of all three children, the only parental
rights on which the case turned were those of the Riendeaus.
148. Id. 5,761 A.2d 291.
149. Id. 6, 761 A.2d 291.
150. Id. 6, 761 A.2d 291. The District Court held a hearing to consider the merits and the
motion to dis-miss. It found that the Rideouts would, under the statute, be granted visitation.
However, the court then found the statute to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
151. Id. 2, 761 A.2d 291.
152. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1803(3) (West 1998)
The court may grant a grandparent reasonable rights of visitation or access to a minor
child upon finding that rights of visitation or access are in the best interest of the child
and would not significantly interfere with any parent-child relationship or with the
parent's rightful authority over the child.
153. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, 22, 761 A.2d 291.
154. Id. 2, 761 A.2d 291.
155. Id. 6, 761 A.2d 291.
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rights. 156 The Law Court did, however, hold that "the state does have a compel-
ling interest in providing a forum within which grandparents who have acted as
parents to their grandchild may seek continued contact with that child." 157 Ac-
cordingly, the court held the Act to be constitutional as applied. 15 8 Two justices
concurred, stating that the Act should be found constitutional on its face, 159 while
one justice dissented, stating that the Act's language did not support the majority's
application of the statute and that the holding would lead to litigation that would
infringe upon parents' fundamental rights. 160
A. Compelling State Interest: Providing a Forum for Primary Caregivers
In light of the Troxel161 decision and other Supreme Court precedent estab-
lishing such a right,162 the Law Court began its analysis in Rideout by recognizing
that parents have a fundamental right "to make decisions concerning the care, cus-
tody, and control of their children. ' 163 Therefore, to find the Act constitutional,
the court had to determine that the Act furthered a compelling state interest. 164
Stating that a finding of harm was not required to advance a compelling state inter-
est16 5 the court held that the state has a compelling interest in injecting itself into
the parent-child relationship when grandparents who have been the "primary
caregiver[s] and custodian[s]" for a "significant period of time" are denied visita-
tion by the parents. 166 The basis of this interest, according to the court, is rooted in
the state's parens patriae authority, 167 or its "general interest in [a] youth's well-
being." 168 Under this reasoning, the courts are to provide a forum in which the
parent's fundamental rights are to be balanced against a child's interest in main-
taining a relationship with people who have served as parents for significant peri-
ods of time. 16 9
Due to the paucity of Supreme Court guidelines defining compelling interests
in contexts such as those presented in Rideout,170 the Law Court was to a consid-
erable extent defining the compelling interest in Rideout free of any guiding legal
precedent. 17 1 The court did note that other states have recognized similar compel-
ling interests in providing a means for a child to maintain relationships with people
156. Id. 23, A.2d 791.
157. Id. 2, A.2d 791.
158. Id. 33, A.2d 791.
159. Id. 35, A.2d 791 (Wathen, C.J., concurring).
160. Id. 47, A.2d 791 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
161. Troxel v. Granville, 530 at 63.
162. See discussion supra Parts III(A), III(B)(I).
163. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, 18, 761 A.2d 291 (quoting Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 66).
164. Id. 20, A.2d 791. See also notes 171-185 and accompanying text.
165. Id. 23, A.2d 791.
166. Id. 27, A.2d 791.
167. Id.
168. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
169. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, 27, 761 A.2d 291. The court declined to define
whether a com-pelling state interest would exist under facts differing from those presented in
Rideour. Id. 27 n.17, A.2d 791.
170. See discussion supra Part III(B)(2); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 98-101 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (describing the history of parental rights vis-A-vis third parties seeking visitation,
and the vagueness of the parameters defining compelling state interests).
171. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized the states' parens patriae interest gener-
ally, without addressing facts such as those presented by Rideout. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. at 166.
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who have acted as primary caregivers. 172 Nonetheless, the court was essentially
crafting a newly defined compelling state interest, making it difficult to assess
whether such a compelling interest would be recognized under the Troxel frame-
work.
B. Whether the Act is Narrowly Tailored to Advance the State's Compelling Interest
Once the court determined that a compelling state interest was at stake, it was
next required to determine whether the Act was narrowly tailored to advance that
interest. 173 The Troxel decision did offer the Law Court some guidance in deter-
mining whether the Maine Act was sufficiently narrow in scope to withstand the
rigors of the Due Process Clause. The Troxel decision rested in part on the fact that
the Washington statute granted no deference to parental decisions nor did it offer
any other protection of parental rights. 174 Finding that measures within the Act
adequately protect the rights of parents would, then, assist the court in staying
within the parameters set forth in Troxel while determining whether the Act was
tailored in a sufficiently narrow manner.
The court held that the Act adequately protects parental rights by (1) requiring
grandparents to establish standing before a hearing on the merits can be held; (2)
requiring the court to consider the parents' objections to visitation; and (3) barring
a visitation order if visitation would interfere with the parent-child relationship or
the parents' authority over the child. 175 The latter two provisions protect parental
interests by injecting those interests into the determination of whether visitation
would be in the child's best interests, 176 even though neither provision gives any
additional weight to the parents' interests or creates a presumption in favor of the
parents. 177 Without addressing how these two provisions satisfy the constitutional
presumption that fit parents are deemed to act in the best interest of their chil-
dren 17 8 in lieu of any weighing of parental interests or presumptions in favor of
parents, the court deemed them sufficient safeguards of parental rights. 179 By
failing to address such constitutional concerns, the decision not only overlooked
one aspect of the Act that might fail to meet the narrow tailoring requirement, but
also left future courts with no guidance in determining how to adequately balance
172. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198 27, 761 A.2d 291. The court cited Youmans v.
Ramos, 711 N.E.2d 165 (Mass. 1999) and V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) for this
proposition. However, these cases are somewhat distinguishable in that they involved situations
in which the courts were acting to either maintain a child's relationship with the "only adult"
who had served as a parent to a child, Youmans v. Ramos, 711 N.E.2d at 172, or where the
intervening party had taken over the parenting role because the parent had been "unwilling to
undertake the obligation of parenthood." V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d at 548-49. Neither such
circumstance existed in Rideout.
173. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198 29, 761 A.2d 291 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). See also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (The
Constitution's "guarantee of 'due process of law' [includes] a substantive component, which
forbids the government to infringe certain 'fundamental' liberty interests.., unless the infringe-
ment is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.").
174. See supra notes 88-89, 94-100, and accompanying text; discussion at Part III(A).
175. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198 1 29-32, 761 A.2d 291.
176. Id. 31, A.2d 791.
177. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1803(2)(D), (3) (West 1998).
178. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 602; see also supra note 124 and accompanying text.
179. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198,1$ 29-32, 761 A.2d 291.
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competing interests when applying these provisions designed to protect parental
interests.
Perhaps most significant in considering protection of parental rights, how-
ever, is the Act's provision requiring grandparents to establish standing before a
hearing on the merits is held. The court found this to be a sufficient safeguard of
parental rights, at least when considered along with the Act's other provisions,
because it provides a "safeguard[ ] against unwarranted intrusions into an intact
family's life." 180 The provision serves this end, according to the court, by pre-
venting parents from being forced to litigate the facts of a case unless the court
first finds that the grandparents are "among those.., who may pursue visits under
the Act." 181
Such a measure designed to prevent unnecessary litigation is essential given
Troxel's recognition that the "burden of litigating a domestic relations proceeding
can itself be 'so disruptive of the parent-child relationship that constitutional right
of a custodial parent ... becomes implicated.- ' 182 However, because the Law
Court held the Act constitutional as applied,18 3 it did not establish a guideline for
when, beyond the circumstances presented in Rideout, grandparents would be among
those who "may pursue visits under the Act." 184 The only guidance provided to
future courts considering visitation appeals was that they would apply the Act con-
stitutionally if they were "vigilant in their application" of the Act's provisions that
protected parental rights. 185
No other guidance as to when grandparents may permissibly seek visitation
through the courts was provided, meaning that courts making the preliminary stand-
ing finding required by the Act would have no legal rule to follow. Given the
continuing uncertainty over when grandparents are among those who may pursue
visitation, the Rideout decision, by failing to establish a clear rule as to who may
pursue visitation, may have only a limited impact in preventing parents from un-
necessarily litigating this preliminary stage of a visitation action. This would,
seemingly, conflict at least somewhat with the Troxel Court's position that such
litigation itself can constitute an infringement of parental rights. 186 Such was the
point made by the dissent in Rideout.187
V. THE RIDEOUT DISSENT
Justice Alexander, who wrote the dissent, stated that the problem with the
Rideout decision, was that it amounted to a "partially constitutional application of
a law" that could not "justif[y] [the court's] interpretation of that law" because the
majority's interpretation was not supported by the language of the statute. 188 Ac-
180. Id. 30, 761 A.2d 291.
181. Id.
182. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 75 (quoting Justice Kennedy's dissent, Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. at 101).
183. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, 29-32, 761 A.2d 291.
184. Id. 30, 761 A.2d 291.
185. Id.
186. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 75 (quoting Justice Kennedy's dissent, Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. at 101).
187. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, 47, 761 A.2d 291 (Alexander, J. dissenting).
188. Id.
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cording to the dissent, the majority had improperly applied the Act's language
granting standing when there is a "sufficient existing relationship" 189 to the facts
of the case to hold that allowing grandparents who had acted as parents to seek
visitation would pass constitutional muster. 190 The dissent argued that no lan-
guage in the Act could reasonably be interpreted to limit its application to such
situations. 19 1
Because the Act could not be interpreted in such a manner, according to the
dissent, it could not meet the challenge of being narrowly tailored to meet a com-
pelling state interest. 192 Two problems are suggested by such an analysis. First,
because the Act requires a preliminary finding of standing that can involve the
parents in litigation before a court determines that the grandparents are among
those that can seek visitation under the Act, it invites a court to infringe upon
parental rights (through the preliminary litigation phase) in order to determine if it
would be constitutional to allow the grandparents to seek visitation. 193 Second,
the lack of a strict guideline would leave the door open for any grandparent to seek
visitation through the courts. 194 Such an "open door" is made more problematic
by the fact that the Act allows grandparents who merely attempt to establish a
relationship with a grandchild to seek visitation. 195
The dissent argued that the result would mean that courts functioning with
"virtually no guidance" would be left to "apply their own personal and essentially
unreviewable lifestyle preferences to resolving each dispute," 196 injecting the state
into family matters before a determination is made that the grandparents could
constitutionally seek visitation, and that the courts would likely be forced to do so
in many cases in which the grandparents would ultimately lack standing to be
granted a hearing on the merits.197 Such a scenario would involve state action that
"is so disruptive of the parent-child relationship" as to infringe on the parents'
fundamental liberties. 198
The dissent's argument that the Act impermissibly leads to parents litigating
visitation before a determination that a visitation action would be constitutional
would, if accepted, undermine the contention that the Act's provisions requiring
189. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1803(l)(B) (West 1998).
190. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, 48,761 A.2d 291 (Alexander, J., dissenting). See
discussion supra Part IV (discussing the majority opinion's application of the statute to situa-
tions in which grandparents had, to some extent, acted as parents to their grandchildren).
191. Id.
192. Id. 53, 761 A.2d 291.
193. Id.; Letter from Hon. John C. Sheldon (Maine District Court, Springvale, Me.) (on file
with author). The dissent compared the majority's approach to holding a statute allowing search
and seizure of motorists without cause to be constitutional if it was found that in most cases
there was probable cause to conduct a search. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, 49, 761
A.2d 291 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
194. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, 48, 761 A.2d 291 (Alexander, J., dissenting)
("[T]he [Act] is an open invitation to any and all comers who can call themselves grandparents
to bring suit to disrupt a family unit.").
195. As the dissent notes, "all that is needed to open the courthouse door" is "[an expressed
desire to establish a relationship." Id. 59, 761 A.2d 291 (Alexander, J., dissenting). See ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1803(1)(C) (West 1998) (stating that standing may be granted when,
in lieu of a sufficient pre-existing relationship, a grandparent has made a "sufficient effort to
establish one").
196. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, 54, 761 A.2d 291.
197. See id. 47-54, 761 A.2d 291.
198. See id. 62, 761 A.2d 291 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 101 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting)).
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grandparents to establish standing and requiring a court to consider the parents'
objections at the preliminary stage serve to adequately protect parental rights. Of
course, the Act has a third provision designed to protect parental rights-the re-
quirement that visitation only be allowed if it would not interfere with the parent-
child relationship or a parent's authority over the child. 199 Noting that "as a mat-
ter of law" a parent's decision against visitation is presumed to be in the child's
best interests, 200 the dissent argued that, if a court were to grant the parent's deci-
sion the weight required by the Troxel decision, then it would be impossible to find
that visitation would not interfere with a parent's rightful authority over their chil-
dren.20 1 If this were the case, the Act would, under the dissent's reasoning, con-
tain no provisions that would adequately protect a parent's rights in a visitation
action.
VI. CONCLUSION: A NEED TO CLARIFY MAINE'S VISITATION ACT
The central premise of the Rideout decision is that the state has a compelling
interest in preserving and maintaining a relationship between a child and a non-
parent who has acted as a parent to the child for some period of time. 202 If this is
accepted as a compelling state interest, the goal is then to ensure that the means
selected to achieve that end is narrowly tailored so as to adequately protect the
rights of parents. Those sympathetic to allowing grandparents to use the courts to
preserve a relationship with their grandchildren will, understandably, view the
Rideout decision favorably. However, as the dissent points out, the decision does
pose some serious constitutional questions. If the goal is indeed to protect a child's
right to a relationship with a grandparent who has served a parental role, it would,
in the long run, be best to address these questions so that this goal can be achieved
in a manner that preserves the fundamental rights of parents.
A reasonable solution lies in further clarification of when, and under what
circumstances, grandparents are entitled to a visitation hearing. As it stands, all
that is certain is that grandparents who have served as the primary caregivers of
their grandchildren are entitled to such a hearing. The Act, of course, is much
broader, requiring only a "sufficient existing relationship" or an attempt to estab-
lish one. 203 It is this breadth of scope that presents a major constitutional chal-
lenge: assuming that, in at least some circumstances, there is a compelling state
interest in preserving a relationship between grandparents and grandchildren, grant-
ing a hearing under the statute would be permissible (questions of narrow tailoring
aside for the moment). Under the Act, though, a court first has to determine whether
199. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1803(3) (West 1998).
200. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, $ 62, 761 A.2d 291 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. at 68-69). It is not clear that Troxel stood for this proposition to such a full extent-the
plurality opinion recognized that, in general, a parent's actions are deemed to be in the best
interest of the child, but did not specifically address visitation, at least not in the context pre-
sented in Rideout. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 68 (stating that the "natural bonds of affec-
tion lead parents to act in the best interests of their children") (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 602 (1979)).
201. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, 63, 761 A.2d 291.
202. See id. 27, 761 A.2d 291 (stating that the relationship between a child and grandpar-
ents who have been "primary caregiver[s] ... warrants application of the court's parens patriae
authority on behalf of the child").
203. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1803(1)(B), (C) (West 1998).
204. See id. § 2(B) ("The parent or legal guardian of the child may file an affidavit in re-
sponse to the grandparent's petition .... ").
the grandparents have standing, a process that involves the parents in litigation20 4
unless they decline to respond to the grandparents' claim.205 What this means is
that parents will be involved in litigation before the constitutionality of the action
is determined-only a finding that a subsequent hearing would be permissible would
render the preliminary actions permissible intrusion into the realm of parental au-
thority.206
Given the traditional presumption that parents act in their children's best in-
terests207 and Troxel's warning that merely involving parents in litigation threat-
ens to infringe upon parental rights, such a process would seem to run head first
into a constitutional roadblock. However, the Troxel directive should not be read
to preclude any visitation action-any type of visitation statute will inevitably
involve parents in litigation before a determination on the merits can be made.
Furthermore, Troxel itself left open the possibility that visitation statutes could be
crafted and applied in a constitutional manner20 8 and the Supreme Court has held
that parental rights may be subject to some state intervention. 20 9 The key, it would
seem, is to ensure that parents are subject to litigation in the most limited number
of situations as would be necessary to achieve the goal of protecting a child's
interest in maintaining a relationship with someone who had served as their pri-
mary caregiver. Then the Act would truly be narrowly tailored to meet a compel-
ling state interest.
This would require a more precise definition of who is to be permitted to seek
visitation under the Act. Perhaps in declining to limit the scope of the Act, the Law
Court indicated that it would view petition actions favorably in circumstances quite
different than those presented in Rideout. Alternatively, the dissent may be correct
in suggesting that a narrow interpretation of the Act is not possible given the lan-
guage of the statute. In either event, the problem of narrow tailoring persists,
which may leave proper resolution in the hands of the legislature.2 10
The approaches taken in various states suggest several possible solutions. 2 11
The scope of the Act could be narrowed to allow grandparents to seek visitation
205. See id. Of course, parents are not required to engage in the preliminary stage of litiga-
tion in which the court is to determine whether the grandparents have standing under the Act.
However, it seems likely that most parents opposed to visitation with the grandparents would
seek to be heard before an even more intrusive hearing on the merits is deemed necessary.
206. Letter from Hon. John C. Sheldon, Judge, Maine District Court, Springvale, Me., to the
author (Mar. 9, 2001) (on file with author).
207. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 68; Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 602.
208. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 73.
209. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972) (stating that even when parental
actions are taken pursuant to religious beliefs that such actions are "not totally free from legisla-
tive restrictions"); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1943) (rights of parenthood are
not beyond limitation); see also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1975) (stat-
ing that the state's interest in preserving parental authority does not extend to giving parents
"absolute power to overrule" a minor's decision to terminate pregnancy).
210. Still developing case law in the states offers little guidance as to possible post-Troxel
judicial treatment of visitation statutes similar to the Maine Act. While a New York visitation
has been held unconstitutional under Troxel, Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497,500 (N.Y. 2000),
the New York statute was much broader than the Maine Act in that it allowed grandparents to
seek visitation whenever "equity would see fit to intervene." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (West
1999).
211. See discussion supra Part II(A) (outlining approaches to visitation statutes among the
fifty states).
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only when a grandchild had lived with them, or been in their care for a specified
period of time in the past. Similarly, grandparents could be permitted to seek
visitation if they had a prior "custodial relationship" 2 12 with their grandchildren.
Additional safeguards of parental rights might also be included-the Act could be
amended to recognize a rebuttable presumption that the parents' decision to deny
visitation was reasonable, or to require grandparents to demonstrate that the par-
ents' decision was unreasonable.
The Rideout court declined to read any restrictions of this type into Maine's
visitation Act. Whether this was done as a matter of choice, or because the lan-
guage of the Act precluded any such reading, the Rideout decision failed to answer
the question of who may seek visitation and when they may do so. This will leave
future courts considering visitation actions without any true guidance. Not only
does this present the problem of a lack of uniformity among the courts, but it also
increases the likelihood that parents will be forced to litigate when court involve-
ment would ultimately be deemed to be unconstitutional.
Somewhere between the extremes of preventing grandparents from seeking
visitation over parents' objections under any circumstances and subjecting parents
to an uncertain statutory scheme that threatens to "haul"'2 13 them into court before
it is even clear that court action would be constitutional there is likely to be a
reasonable middle ground. Crafting a new statutory rule that provides clearer guid-
ance as to when grandparents may seek visitation could go a long way toward
achieving the objective of protecting competing rights to the greatest extent pos-
sible. Even such a middle ground approach requires acceptance of the idea that
"providing a forum within which grandparents who have acted as parents to their
grandchild[ren] ' '2 14 is indeed a compelling state interest. If, however, such a propo-
sition is accepted, finding a middle ground that provides a forum for grandparents
only in appropriate situations (when they have acted as parents) without subjecting
parents to litigation any more often than is absolutely necessary to achieve that end
can only serve to further the interests of all parties involved.
Theodore Small
212. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5 (1998); see discussion supra Part II(A).
213. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, 59, 761 A.2d 291 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
214. Id. 2, 761 A.2d 291.
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